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ABSTENTION AND PRIMARY JURISDIC-
TION: TWO CHIPS OFF THE SAME
BLOCK?-A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS*
Sidney A. Shapirot
I
INTRODUCTION
A plaintiff who properly qualifies for federal jurisdiction may
not always receive a hearing in federal court. Although the right of
the plaintiff to be in federal court is to be respected,1 other
concerns of administering justice sometimes result in the federal
courts sending the plaintiff to litigate his claims elsewhere. Two of
the most frequently espoused reasons for sending plaintiffs to
another decision-maker are the doctrines of abstention and pri-
mary jurisdiction.2
* The views herein expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Federal Trade Commission.
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. Staff Attorney for the Federal Trade Commission.
B.S. 1970, J.D. 1973, University of Pennsylvania.
I The most frequently cited expression of a qualified plaintiffs right to enjoy federal
court jurisdiction is by Chief justice Marshall:
It is most irue that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should.... Questions may occur
which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to
exercise our best judgement, and conscientiously to perform our duty.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82, 100 (1821). This right, of course, is still
recognized today. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). ("Congress imposed the duty
upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of federal
forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims."). See also Martin v.
Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 226-29 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court also insists that any departures from hearing a plaintiff who is properly in
federal court occur only in "special circumstances." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
At the same time the Court has said that since it often retains jurisdiction while
abstaining, a plaintiff is not actually denied his right to be in federal court. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964); Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959) ("This principle does not, of course, involve the abdication of
federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise .... ). But given the
inconveniences caused the plaintiff by abstention, he is effectively denied that right, making
the issue of the validity of abstention an important procedural question. See note 16 and
accompanying text infra.
2 In McGuire v. Iowa, 320 F. Supp. 243, 245 (S.D. Iowa 1970), the court noted, "In
view of the fact [abstention] is necessary as an irreducible minimum to the preservation of a
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A. The Abstention Doctrine
Basically, abstention is the discretionary decision by a federal
court that certain issues properly presented in federal court must
be litigated instead in state court.3 Three principal concerns have
led the federal courts to redirect traffic to state courts. Abstention
first occurred in equity cases involving both federal constitutional
claims and issues of unclear state law. Adhering to the doctrine
that the Supreme Court should not pass on constitutional questions
unless such adjudication was unavoidable,4 the Court in the 1941
case of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,5 refused to pass upon
the constitutional question presented, reasoning that the undear
question of state law before it might be resolved in a way which
would make consideration of the constitutional issue unnecessary.6
In the interest of advancing federal-state relationships, the
Court thought the state court should decide the state law question.
Otherwise, a decision by the federal court on the state law question
could later be displaced by a decision of the state court of last
resort-a court which was not bound to follow the results of the
federal court. The possibility of a state court in effect "overruling"
a federal court was thought to be a result which could hardly
promote "the reign of law."'7
A second and separate reason for abstention was established in
strong Federalism, it is doubtful that it will ever completely 'lose its charm."' Regarding
primary jurisdiction it has been said, "[Tihis Court [has] recognized ... that coordination
between traditional judicial machinery and these agencies was necessary.... The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction has become one of the key judicial switches through which this current
has passed." Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic 400
U.S. 62, 68 (1970).
3 IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE t 0.203[1]-[2] (2d ed. 1974).
4 See note 6 infra.
5 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman, a Texas regulation that all Pullman cars be under the
supervision of a person holding the status of conductor was attacked as discriminatory under
the fourteenth amendment since all conductors were white and the cars were previously
supervised by porters, all of whom were black. The Texas Railroad Commission's authority
to make such an order was unclear under existing Texas law. The Court abstained pending
a clarification of that law in state court.
6 Id. at 498. The practice of avoiding premature constitutional decisions has long been
followed: "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality...
unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S.
101, 105 (1944). Pullman merely established that the opportunity of first resolving unclear
state law questions was another way to follow the doctrine. See, e.g., Meridian v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v.
Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); Reid
v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1971); Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 444 F.2d 38
(5th Cir. 1971); Egner v. Texas City Independent School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Moyer v. Nelson, 324 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
7 312 U.S. at 500.
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Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 8 Again sitting in equity, the Court decided
that state law questions relating to the pervasive regulation of local
industry by state agencies so intimately involved the interests of a
state that the proper procedure would be for a federal court to
defer to a state court on these questions. 9 Unlike Pullman, no
federal constitutional question was involved. The Court, however,
placed heavy emphasis upon the expertise of the state court in
reviewing the technical questions involved in regulation by the
particular state agency.10
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,11 the
Supreme Court articulated a third reason for abstention. The
Court determined that a federal court should not decide a state law
question where such a decision would disrupt the implementation
of politically important programs of a state government.1 2 The
Thibodaux decision was notable on two grounds. First, unlike Pull-
man and Burford, the case was nonequitable in nature; thus it
eliminated any limitation of the abstention doctrine to equity
cases.' 3 Second, the case made no suggestion that the state law
issue involved must be a technical question relating to complex
regulation by a state agency as in Burford.1 4
The result of these three decisions has been to establish wide
criteria under which abstention may be allowed. The broadness of
the criteria has led to significant inconsistency in Supreme Court
decisions15 and thus has made the exact boundaries of abstention
uncertain.
The party most direcfly-and usually adversely-affected by
8 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
9 Id. at 332; see text accompanying notes 88-94 infra. At issue in Burford was the validity
of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission granting the appellant a permit to drill oil
wells on a certain plot. The Commission had the responsibility under Texas law of
organizing the method by which the oil reserves in Texas could best be utilized and
protected. The Court decided the order of the Texas Commission should be reviewed in
state, rather than federal, court.
10 319 U.S. at 326-27; accord, Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
1 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
12 In Thibodaux, the ability of the state to take certain lands through the power of
eminent domain was challenged by a land owner. The owner argued that existing state law
precluded such a taking. The Court deferred to the Louisiana state courts for an interpreta-
tion of the state law.
13 360 U.S. at 28; see text accompanying notes 111-13 infra. Any doubt that Thibodaux
had ended the law-equity distinction was resolved in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S.
207 (1960), where the federal court had diversity jurisdiction in an action to recover losses
claimed to be covered by an insurance policy. See generaly Comment, Abstention iy Federal
Courts Having Jurisdiction iy Diversity of Citizenship, 30 Mo. L. REv. 460 (1965).
14 See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
15 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 41-67 and accompanying text infra.
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the expansion of the abstention doctrine is the plaintiff. Any time
abstention is invoked, the plaintiff is relegated to a much longer
and costlier law suit.16 Abstention is therefore characterized by a
tension between two opposing concerns: on one hand, the expense
and inconvenience to plaintiffs who would otherwise properly be in
federal court, and on the other, the advantages of a federal court's
being able to defer to a state court for the determination of certain
issues. 1 7
16 Once the federal court has abstained, the party is often forced to recommence the
action at the bottom of the state court hierarchy and work his way up to the state supreme
court. See, e.g., United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
Occasionally the plaintiff may be shuffled back and forth between various federal and state
courts. See, e.g., Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 116 F.
Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1953) (three-judge district court abstains in action by labor union and
state employee for judgment declaring unconstitutional and injunction restraining enforce-
ment of Alabama statute (Solomon bill) providing for "forfeiture [of] all rights afforded
[public employees] under the State Merit System and employment rights ... as a result of his
public employment." 116 F. Supp. at 355 n.1.), affd, 347 U.S. 901 (1954); Government &
Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 262 Ala. 285, 78 So. 2d 646 (1955) (in
action for declaratory judgment that plaintiff association not labor union as defined in
Solomon bill and for injunction against enforcement Alabama Supreme Court affirms lower
court holding statute applicable to plaintiff and statute constitutional); Government & Civic
Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 146 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1956) (three-judge
district court dismisses with prejudice action to declare unconstitutional and to restrain
enforcement of Solomon bill); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v.
Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (vacating judgment of three-judge district court and remand-
ing to district court to retain jurisdiction "until all efforts to obtain an appropriate adjudica-
tion in the state courts have been exhausted." 353 U.S. at 367); American Fed'n of-State
Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 104 So. 2d 827 (1958) (court holds not justiciable
controversy in action by Government and Civic Employees Organizing Comm.'s successor
for judgnent declaring Solomon bill unconstitutional).
If the result in the state court does not render unnecessary a decision on the constitu-
tional daim the plaintiff then may return to federal court and have a trial on the merits.
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). Thus, it is easy
to condude with Professor Wright that "[e]xperience with [abstention] has been.., tragic.
These cases shuttle back and forth from the state court to the federal court. They go on
endlessly." Wright, Federal Question Jurisdiction, The American Law Institute's Proposals on the
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 17 S.C.L. REv. 659, 667 (1965). Some
cases may exist in various stages of litigation for a decade or more. See, e.g., England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 U.S. 885 (1966); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
A current movement to ease this burden seeks to abandon England and require federal
as well as state claims to be litigated where practical in state court. ALI, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1371(c)(4) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1968). Another suggestion is to make greater use of certification. Id. § 1371(e).
17 Professor Kurland has described this tension as the central problem of abstention:
[Abstention] cases reveal two problems of what I have called "cooperative judicial
federalism." The first is how to utilize the special expertise of each of two judicial
systems, State and federal. The second is how to economize on the use of the
systems so that one lawsuit will suffice to dispose of the problem rather than
permitting two with the possibility of conflicting results as well as multiple costs.
Kurland, Toward A Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481, 487 (1959).
ABSTENTION & PRIMARY JURISDICTION
B. The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine
The development of the abstention doctrine and its effect on
plaintiffs have been amply described by the commentators."8 This
Article suggests that a useful way of discussing the current state of
the abstention doctrine is to compare abstention to primary juris-
diction. The usefulness of the comparison of the two doctrines lies
in their almost identical rationales.
In certain types of cases Congress has granted both a federal
agency and a federal court jurisdiction to hear an issue.19 To deal
with this overlap of authority, the federal courts have developed
the practice of using their discretionary power to decide that
certain issues otherwise properly in federal court must be litigated
before a federal administrative agency.20 Similarly, in cases where
abstention is invoked there is concurrent jurisdiction because either
the state claims are pendent to federal claims for equitable relief 2
or there is diversity jurisdiction.22 Thus, in primary jurisdiction
and in abstention, the plaintiff enjoys a statutory right to be in
federal court.
Moreover, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the plain-
tiff is denied his day in federal court for reasons which are similar
to those underlying the abstention doctrine. In Texas & Pacific Ry.
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 23 the case originating the doctrine of
18 See, e.g., 3 K. DAvIs, AINIsTRATIVE LAw TRTiSniE §§ 19.01-.09 (1958); Kur-
land, supra note 17; Liebenthal, A Dialogue On England: The England Case, Its Effect on the
Abstention Doctrine, and Some Suggested -Solutions, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 157 (1966);
Schoenfeld, American Federalism and the Abstention Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 73 DICK. L.
REv. 605 (1969); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs L. REv. 815 (1959);
Note, The Federal Abstention Doctrine: An Analysis of Its Present Function and Future Application,
16 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 937 (1965); Note, Judicial Abstention From the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction, 59 COLUM. L. Rxv. 749 (1959); Comment, The Exercise of the Abstention Doctrine
and Its Consequences: A Clarification, 6 DUQUESNE L. Rxv. 269 (1968); Note, Doctrine of
Abstention: Need of Reappraisal, 40 NoTRE D.ME LAw. 101 (1964); Comment, The Abstention
Doctrine, 40 TUL. L. Rxv. 579 (1966).
19 K. DAvis. ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 197, at 664 (1951): "Questions of primary
jurisdiction arise only when the statutory arrangements are such that administrative and
judicial jurisdictions are concurrent for the initial decision of some questions." See Jaffee,
Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. Rlv. 1037, 1037-40 (1964).
"O K. DAvis, supra note 18, §§ 19.01-.09; Jaffee, supra note 19; Note, The Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction: A Reexamination of Its Purpose and Practicality, 48 GEo. L.J. 563 (1960).
2" See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); cf. Siler v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) (in action to enjoin order of railroad commission on
constitutional and statutory grounds federal court had jurisdiction because federal questions
not merely colorable but raised in good faith and federal court could decide case on local or
state questions ouly).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960);
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
23 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The oil company contended that the railroad had extracted an
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primary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court decided that if both the
federal courts and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
were to decide the reasonableness of railroad tariff rates, the
almost inevitable disparity of results would make it virtually impos-
sible for the ICC to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain uniform
rates.24 Therefore, attacks on the reasonableness of tariff rates in
federal court were to be referred to the ICC even though the
federal court had jurisdiction to hear the issue.
The doctrine was refined by Justice Brandeis in Great Northern
Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co. 25 Brandeis did not feel that uniformity
in tariff construction always required resort to the ICC. When a
rate was attacked as unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory, uni-
formity did require recourse to the Commission since the inquiry
was "essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical
matters. 26 This was particularly true because this kind of determi-
nation could be reached only upon "voluminous and conflicting
evidence"--the kind of evidence which could best be dealt with by a
body of experts.27 A federal court, unequipped to decide technical
issues of fact, could, by wrongly deciding such questions, interfere
with the agency's ability to achieve uniformity of regulation. But
when the dispute over a tariff involved not questions of fact, but
issues of law, Brandeis argued that the federal courts were compe-
tent to decide such questions since neither technical matters nor
agency expertise would be involved.2 8
unjust and unreasonable price for bauling certain shipments of cotton seed. It wanted the
Court to declare the existing rates invalid. The Court, bowever, held that the ICC should
first decide the validity of the rates.
24 Id. at 440.
25 259 U.S. 285 (1922). The issue before the Court was whether a certain shipping
charge was proper under tariff rates filed with the ICC. The Court held tbat because of the
tecbnical matters involved in construing the tariff, the ICC should decide the issue. Id. at
293-94.
26 Id. at 291.
27 Id.
[W]here the document to he construed is a tariff... and before it can be construed
it is necessary to determine upon evidence the peculiar meaning of words or the
existence of incidents alleged to be attached by usage to the transaction, tbe
preliminary determination must be made by the Commission .... If this were not
so, that uniformity which it is the purpose of the Commerce Act to secure could not
be attained.
Id. at 292.
28 Id. at 291. Justice Brandeis noted that with respect to the case before him
no fact, evidential or ultimate, is in controversy; and there is no occasion for the
exercise of administrative discretion. The task to be performed is to determine the
meaning of words of the tariff which were used in their ordinary sense and to apply
that meaning to the undisputed facts. That operation was solely one of construc-
tion; and preliminary resort to the Commission was, therefore, unnecessary.
Id. at 294.
[Vol. 60:75
ABSTENTION & PRIMARY JURISDICTION
This emphasis on a law-fact distinction was modified thirty
years later by Far East Conference v. United States.29 The Court
recognized in this decision a more comprehensive reason for
primary jurisdiction:
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business en-
trusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited
functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exer-
cised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better
equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure.30
In other words, not only is a specialized federal agency more likely
to have greater expertise in a particular area, but its organization
and procedures may also lend themselves to a more thorough and
better informed treatment of the issues.31
Thus, the rationale of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, as
defined in these cases, is decidedly similar to that of abstention. As
in abstention, a major concern is that a decision by a federal court
would be an interference with the ability of a governmental unit to
carry out a program for which it is responsible. In abstention as
well as in primary jurisdiction, the deferral is to a decision-maker
possessing greater familiarity with the issues that need to be consid-
ered and also having the expertise to deal with the specialized
questions involved. And with both doctrines there is a sense of the
needs of comity and respect for fellow decision-makers charged
with coextensive responsibility.3 2
29 342 U.S. 570 (1952). The case involved an antitrust suit by the United States against
an association of steamship companies whose members were alleged to be jointly setting
rates. The rates set by the association had been approved by the predecessor of the Federal
Maritime Board. The Court held that before a decision on the antitrust violations could be
made, certain questions, requiring the particular expertise of the Maritime Commission,
would have to be decided.
30 Id. at 574-75.
31 The Supreme Court has also emphasized the importance of federal agencies as
policy-enforcing bodies:
[Tihe ... question presented is whether effectuation of the statutory purposes of
[an Act require an agency to] first pass on the... dispute...; this, in turn, depends
on whether the question raises issues of... policy which ought to be considered by
the [agency] in the interests of a uniform and expert administration of the
regulatory scheme laid down by that Act.
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 65 (1956).
32 Professor Davis has written that "[t]he principal reason behind the doctrine [of
primary jurisdiction] is recognition of the need for orderly and sensible coordination of the
work of agencies and the courts." 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, § 19.01, at 5. It likewise has
been observed that primary jurisdiction "is not technically a question of jurisdiction' but
rather a matter of judicial self-restraint in conformance with comity and a healthy respect
1974]
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C. The Basis for Comparison
Since the rationales behind the doctrines of abstention and
primary jurisdiction are basically similar, the situations in which the
two doctrines are employed can be expected to be at least generally
analogous. To the extent that there are differences in application,
the question arises whether those differences result from the
nature of each respective doctrine or from an inconsistency in one
of the doctrines. 33 Thus, primary jurisdiction provides a useful
benchmark against which to gauge the consistency and suitability
of the abstention doctrine as it has developed. 34 In the following
discussion, primary jurisdiction will be so used.
II
ABSTENTION AND PRIMARY JURISDICTION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Whether a federal court will abstain in a given case depends
upon whether the case fits within one or more of the categories of
precedent where abstention has been thought to be appropriate. In
Pullman-type cases, a court must be seeking to avoid a potentially
unnecessary constitutional decision by first having an unclear state
law question decided. 35 In Burford-type cases, the court must-be
trying to avoid interfering with a complex" and technical scheme of
state regulation. 36 And in Thibodaux-type cases the court must be
for the statutory authority of the administrative agency." Weidberg v. American Airlines,
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 407, 409 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
33 The principal difference between the doctrines does not affect this method of
analysis. In abstention, the final authority on the state law question referred to the state
court is the highest state court. However, in primary jurisdiction, decisions by an agency on
questions sent to it are subject to review by the appropriate federal court. Federal Maritime
Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958). That review may be limited in certain antitrust
cases. See note 70 infra. But since the principal concern here is with the criteria used to send
questions to concurrent decision makers, this difference is not important.
34 In part, the usefulness of primary jurisdiction as a touchstone derives from what
appears to be fairly general agreement about its nature. According to one commentator,
[the heart of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not at all controversial. Indeed,
few aspects of administrative law have been so systematically and satisfactorily
developed. The cases on primary jurisdiction . .. form a coherent body of law,
unusually free from confusion or inconsistency.
3 K. DAviS, supra note 18, § 19.01, at 6. Of course, there are some differences of opinion
about the limits of the doctrine. See note 70 infra. But it is the bask doctrine which is
primarily used for comparison purposes. Where the certainty of primary jurisdiction is in
doubt, that doubt is noted where it is likely to have an effect upon the comparison with
abstention.
35 See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra and note 39 infra.
36 See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra and notes 88-94 infra.
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concerned with federal interference with politically important state
programs.37
To assist in determining whether any of these factors exist in a
particular case, the Supreme Court has attempted to set guidelines
for the different types of abstention. The guidelines for abstention
in Pullman-, Burford-, and Thibodaux-type cases are discussed below.
In each instance, a comparison with primary jurisdiction is used to
evaluate the viability of the guidelines set by the Court.
A. The Unclear State Law Question
The general Pullman requirement that a court must be seeking
to avoid the unnecessary decision of a constitutional question is a
clear limitation which has provided courts with few problems.38
Consequently, it will not be discussed. However, the requirement
in Pullman that there must be "an uncertain issue of state law"39 has
not proven to be as free of problems. It is with this question that
the case law has been concerned. 40
The requirement that there be present an unclear issue of
state law raises the essential question of when a state law question is
clear enough to be decided by a federal court. Supreme Court
cases provide no absolute answer. Confusion often arises because
what appears to be a clear or unclear state law question to some of
the Justices appears to be the opposite to other Justices. Moreover,
what sometimes appears to be a clear or unclear state law question
to all of the Justices appears to be the very opposite to many
outsiders.
For example, in Lake Carriers Association v. MacMullen,41 the
Supreme Court found the terms of the Michigan Watercraft Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1970 "far from clear in particulars that go to
the foundation of [appellant's] grievance. ' 42 Thus, the Court held
that abstention was proper in order to allow the Michigan courts to
determine the validity of the appellant's contention that the state's
a See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra and notes 109-16 infra.
38 The question of whether or not the plaintiff alleges both federal constitutional and
state law claims should pose no problem to a court. Depending on the nature of the state
claim, the court should easily be able to determine if the constitutional question can be
avoided. Cf. Wright, supra note 18, at 820.
39 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965). Without such an unclear question,
the reason for deferring to the state court disappears since there would no longer exist the
possibility that a federal court decision would be displaced by a later state court decision. See
text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
40 See notes 41-67 and accompanying text infra.
41 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
42 Id. at 511.
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water purification standards were contrary to federal standards
and were therefore void. 43 The two dissenting Justices came to a
directly opposite conclusion, finding the Michigan statute "not
ambiguous. 44
In a prior case, Reetz v. Bozanich,45 the Court had agreed that
abstention was required. The opinion was unanimous even though
the Alaskan fishing laws at issue appeared to be quite clear.46 Yet in
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,47 the Court did not allow abstention
because there was "no ambiguity" in the Wisconsin statute under
consideration. 48 Dissenting, Chief Justice Burger complained, "It is
no answer to contend that there is no ambiguity in the Wisconsin
statute and hence no need to abstain; in Reetz the Alaskan statute
could not have been more plain .... 49
Thus, the mere statement that for a federal court to abstain in
a Pullman situation there must be "an uncertain issue of state law"50
is not useful. No consistent approach to the rule has been taken by
the individual members of the Court or by the Court as a whole.
In addition to the Supreme Court's inconsistency, there is a
second factor affecting the question of when an issue of state law is
unclear. The Court has generally been unwilling to refer ambigu-
ous state statutes to a state court if the state statute "is not fairly
subject to an interpretation which will avoid or modify the federal
constitutional question."51 This doctrine developed in cases involv-
ing civil rights52 and the first amendment.53 Because of the impor-
43 Id. at 512.
4 Id. at 514 (Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger joined in this dissent.
4- 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
46 At issue was an Alaskan statute which limited the granting of commercial salmon
fishing licenses to specifically defined groups of persons-i.e., those who had "previously
held a... license for [a) specific salmon registration area" or who had "for any three years,
held a commercial fishing license and while so licensed actively engaged in commercial
fishing in [a) specific area." Id. at 83. Since the appellee did not qualify under these
provisions, he attacked the statute as a denial of equal protection. The Court found the
above seemingly clear -portions of the statute sufficiently ambiguous to require the district
court to abstain.
47 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
48 Id. at 439. The Wisconsin statute at issue in the case allowed a city police chief to post
a notice in all retail liquor stores in his city stating that the appellee could not be sold liquor
because she exhibited in her excessive drinking certain traits specifically enumerated in the
statute. Id. at 434. Because the statute had no provision for notice or hearing, it was held to
deny the appellee due process of law. Id. at 437.
49 Id. at 442 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
50 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965).
51 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 (1967), quoting United States v. Livingston, 179
F. Supp. 9, 12-13 (E.D.S.C. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
52 See, e.g., Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (in action challenging constitu-
tionality of statute which restricted voting, district court did not abuse discretion by declining
[Vol. 60:75
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tant nature of these rights,54 the Court has often taken the position
that the delay involved in a referral to a state court would be so
detrimental to a plaintiff that abstention would be inappropriate in
light of the small chance that a state court interpretation could save
the statute from being declared unconstitutional. 55
Thus, the requirement of an unclear state law question has
been tempered by considerations of the nature of the wrong
asserted by plaintiff and the likelihood that the statute can be so
modified as to avoid a constitutional question. Similar considera-
tions may help to explain the inconsistent approach taken by the
Court in recent cases. 56
In Lake Carriers Association v. MacMullen, the Supreme Court
emphasized that "[t]he paradigm case for abstention arises when
the challenged statute is susceptible of 'a construction by the state
courts that would avoid or modify the [federal] constitutional
question.' 57 Since the Michigan courts had not yet had an oppor-
tunity to construe the statute, the Court felt they should be given
this opportunity.58 The lack of any prior review of the state statute
to abstain); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (importance of issues in school
desegregation case required decision rather than abstention); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963) (challenge to racial segregation in schools litigable 'in federal court);
Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (abstention unnecessary because legality of
segregation in public restaurants foreclosed by previous decisions). But see Askew v. Har-
grave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (lower court relied on wrong precedents in declining to abstain in
action challenging constitutionality of state law limiting ad valorem taxes for school purposes);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (district court should have abstained in action
alleging discriminatory state statutes).
53 See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967); Bagget v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
51 We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights under
the Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we
have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the
rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum.
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967), quoting Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55
(D. Kan.), appeal dismiued per stipulation sub no., McElroy v. Mitchell, 326 U.S. 690 (1945). See
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 n.6 (1963).
55 In Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 (1967), the Court declared: "[lt is the duty
of a federal court to decide the federal question . . . . Any other course would impose
expense and long delay upon the litigants without hope of its bearing fruit."
"6 For an alternative explanation of the Court's inconsistency see Kurland, supra note
17, at 488. Kurland suggests that the difficulty arises "in no small part from the fact that the
utilization of the two judicial systems for the expertise which each possesses does not have an
equal appeal to all members of the Court." Id.
5 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972), quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967).
58 Id. at 511-12. The Court specifically noted:
The Michigan Watercraft Pollution Control Act of 1970 has not been construed in
any Michigan court.... We do not know, of course, how far Michigan courts will go
in interpreting the requirements of the state ... Act in light of the federal Water
Quality Improvement Act and the constraints of the United States Constitution. But
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was also emphasized in Reetz v. Bozanich where the Court noted
that "the provisions of the Alaska Constitution at issue havte never
been interpreted by an Alaskan court."59 And Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,60 thought the lack of any
prior state review should have changed the majority's decision not
to abstain even though the statute involved was clear. 61
Besides this respect for comity, the requirement of an unclear
state law has also been tempered by consideration of the other
reasons for abstention.62 In Reetz the Court was faced with a typical
Pullman-type situation in which it was trying to avoid deciding an
unnecessary constitutional question. Yet Justice Douglas, writing
for the Court, in addition to relying on Pullman also relied upon
the rationale of Thibodaux,63 without citing it, by emphasizing the
importance to Alaska of its fishing and game laws. 4 This
strengthened the Court's belief that an Alaskan court should first
be allowed to pass on the state questions involved in the case. 65
What these cases make clear is that the requirement of state
law uncertainty is relative. It is variously influenced by comity, by
the nature of the rights involved, and by the other reasons for
abstention.66 Because of the variability of such influences, the rule
is uncertain and prediction of outcomes is difficult.
we are satisfied that authoritative resolution of the ambiguities in the Michigan law
is sufficiently likely to avoid or significantly modify the federal questions appellants
raise to warrant abstention ....
Id.
59 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970).
60 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
61 According to the Chief Justice, it seemed to be "a very odd business to strike down a
state statute, on the books for almost 40 years, without any opportunity for the state courts
to dispose of the problem. Id. at 440 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
62 See note 17 supra.
63 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
" Id. at 87. Thibodaux ordered abstention in those cases in which a federal court
decision would seriously disrupt politically important state programs. See text accompanying
notes 11-14 supra and notes 109-16 infra. Justice Douglas used similar language in Reetz:
"The constitutional provisions relate to fish resources, an asset unique in its abundance in
Alaska. The statute and regulations relate to that same unique resource, the manage-
ment of which is a matter of great state concern." 397 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).
65 "A state court decision here ...could conceivably avoid any decision under the
Fourteenth Amendment and would avoid any possible irritation in the federal-state relation-
ship." 397 U.S. at 86-87.
" See note 16supra. In addition to the already existing influences, ChiefJustice Burger
would like to see another considered-the wise use of judicial resources:
I quite agree that there is no absolute duty to abstain-to stay our hand-until
the state courts have at least been asked to construe their own statute, but for me it
is the negation of sound judicial administration-and an unwarranted use of a
limited judicial resource-to impose this kind of case on a . . federal district
court....
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The suitability of the rule can therefore be called into ques-
tion. To the extent it is uncertain, it offers only limited guidance to
lower courts. To the extent it is based on variable factors, its
application can depend on the predilections of individual judges.
For example, the use of the doctrine by the Supreme Court has
tended to be cyclical. 67 A perspective on whether these disadvan-
tages are unavoidable or whether a clearer rule could be fashioned
may be gained by a comparison with the criteria developed for
applying primary jurisdiction.
There is no one exact test used for primary jurisdiction.
Instead, courts are instructed that "[iun every case the question is
whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present
and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application
in the particular litigation. '68 Under this test, the reasons for
primary jurisdiction 69 result in its use in two principal categories of
cases.7 0 First, in cases where rates, rules, or practices are attacked as
This Court . . should not be subject to the added pressures of non-urgent
state cases which the state courts have never been called on to resolve.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). One court
has followed this suggestion (Alberda v. Noell, 322 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1971)), but
another has flatly rejected it (Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972)).
A summary of all the factors which have influenced the Court is found in Schoenfeld,
supra note 18.
11 "During the 1950's and 1960's the doctrine of abstention seemingly was confined
within narrow limits .... But, the last two Terms of the [Supreme] Court have witnessed the
rejuvenation of the full implications of the Pullman doctrine." Reid v. Board of Educ., 453
F.2d 238, 241-42 (2d Cir. 1971). For a description of tbe cycle which occurred in the field of
civil liberties see Schoenfeld, supra note 18, at 606-18; Comment, I Used to Love You but It's All
Over Now: Abstention and the Federal Courts' Retreat from Their Role as PrimaTy Guardians of First
Amendment Freedoms, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 847 (1972).
18 United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); see Locust Cartage Co. v.
Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 430 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964
(1970).
69 See text accompanying notes 23-31 supra.
70 The categories are further described in Fremlin, Primary Jurisdiction and the Federal
Maritime Commission, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 743-46 (1967); 33 OHio ST. .J 209, 213-14
(1972).
There is a third category of cases. Under some regulatory schemes, statutes provide that
agency approval of certain actions, such as common rate fixing, exempts such actions from
the antitrust laws. In cases where these actions are attacked as violating the antitrust laws, the
agency must first be given the opportunity to decide whether the practice attacked is subject
to, or exempt from th& antitrust laws before the federal court can act. See, e.g., Carnation Co.
v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 220, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966); Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Laveson v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972). One commentator has summarized this
category as follows:
The doctrine is invoked when activity prohibited by the antitrust laws may arguably
be immunized by the regulatory statute, and an administrative determination of
that issue is required before the question of antitrust liability is resolved.
Fremlin, supra, at 789.
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unreasonable or discriminatory, the appropriate administrative
agency is usually permitted to initially decide the question.7 1 The
rationale here is that these situations involve an examination of
issues particularly known to and appreciated by the agency.
Port of Boston Marine Terminal Association v. Redeiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic72 is illustrative of this first category. A group of
marine carriers refused to pay a revised charge to the Marine
Terminal Association for cargo left on the pier beyond a certain
time because the demurrage fee had not been approved by the
Federal Maritime Commission. They insisted that the old charge,
agreed on by a conference of carriers and the Terminal Associa-
tion, was proper. The district court stayed the proceedings to
allow the Federal Maritime Commission to rule on the reasonable-
ness of the new tariff. 3 The Supreme Court upheld the action,
reasoning that the situation presented
an almost classic case for engaging the doctrine [of primary
jurisdiction] .... Just five years earlier, the [Federal Maritime]
Primary jurisdiction is also applicable in antitrust cases based on the "normal" reasons
for the doctrine. Whenever a court decision in an antitrust case would affect the agency's
ability to regulate either because the reasonableness of a rate is at issue, or because the
question involved is technical, the question is first referred to the agency. After the agency's
decision, the antitrust questions are then considered. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); cf. Maddock & Miller, Inc. v. United States Lines, 365 F.2d 98 (2d
Cir. 1966).
Some commentators have expressed displeasure over such use of primary jurisdiction in
antitrust cases. They feel that the purposes behind the antitrust laws should have a higher
priority than the regulatory purposes behind primary jurisdiction and, unless this priority is
respected, antitrust enforcement will suffer. See, e.g., Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered.
The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577(1954); Schwartz, LegalRestriction of Competition in
the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REv. 436 (1954).
For an opposing viewpoint see 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, § 19.06, at 36-38.
This continuing debate (see Latta, Primary Jurisdiction in the Regulated Industries and the
Antitrust Law, 30 U. CIN. L. REv. 261 (1961)) does not affect the basic rationale of primary
jurisdiction, but only its application in the face of a competing interest in the antitrust laws.
And since it is the basic rationale of primary jurisdiction, and not its limits in antitrust cases,
which is being compared to abstention, the debate does not affect the present analysis.
"' See, e.g., Danna v. Air France, 463 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissal for failure to
state claim upon which relief could be granted affirmed in absence of prior finding by CAB
of statutory violation in action alleging youth fares violated Federal Aviation Act of 1958);
McCleneghan v. Union Stock Yards Co., 298 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1962) (primary jurisdiction
doctrine properly applied and district court properly refused jurisdiction over part of
private antitrust action alleging "pen" assignment discriminatory under Packers and Stock-
yards Act); Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951) (in action against
airline for loss ofjewelry court of appeals affirmed district court holding airline's tariff rules
part of contract between parties and court without jurisdiction to grant relief to plaintiff
until CAB found rules unlawful or administrative remedies exhausted).
72 400 U.S. 62 (1970).
73 Id. at 65.
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Commission approved the very agreement that established [these
rates]... and the scope of this same agreement was the subject
of the present dispute. The Commission was uniquely qualified
to consider the dispute in light of the overall policies concerning
• . . carrier vessels .... 74
However, the doctrine is not applicable if a rule is not attacked
as unreasonable or discriminatory, because then the issues involved
are usually nontechnical. 5 This was the case in CAB v. Modern Air
Transport, Inc.7 6 The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) sought to
enjoin Modern from exceeding its authorized frequency and regu-
larity of flights. Modern argued that primary jurisdiction required
that the CAB first take action. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, however, countered that the doctrine was "not
applicable where the issue, regardless of its complexity, is not the
reasonableness of the rate or rule, but a violation of such rate or
rule."7
The second category of cases is characterized by the presence
of "technical" questions. Although in most instances courts will
retain jurisdiction of a controversy which calls merely for legal
conclusions, they will decline to do so if the issues involved are
technical in nature. When technical questions peculiarly within the
74 Id. at 68-69.
's See, e.g., W.P Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 299 U.S. 393, 397
(1937); Texas & P. Ry. v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 270 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1926); Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co., 238 U.S. 275, 282-83 (1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal
Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining
Co., 230 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1913); Crain v. Blue Grass Stockyards Co., 399 F.2d 868 (6th Cir.
1968); Corneli Seed Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 263 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Sumter County School Dist., 232 F. Supp. 945 (E.D.S.C. 1964); ICC v. Shippers Coop., Inc.,
196 F. Supp. 8, 10 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 308 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1962). As Justice Lamar
stated in Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., supra at 131-32,
[i]n a suit where the rule of practice itself is attacked as unfair or discriminatory, a
question is raised which calls for the exercise of the judgment and discretion of the
administrative power which has been vested by Congress in the Commission ....
But if the carrier's rule, fair on its face, has been unequally applied and the suit
is for damages, occasioned by its violation or discriminatory enforcement, there is
no administrative question involved, the courts being called on to decide a mere
question of fact as to whether the carrier has violated the rule to plaintiffs damage.
76 179 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1950).
77 I& at 624. The court added:
Our present case is one involving the violation of a lawful regulation of the
Board, rather than one requiring expert appraisal of the reasonableness of a
company action. The Board ... has granted an exemption for non-certified carriers
and has set out the standards with which the carrier must comply ....
Unless we deliberately shut our eyes to the criteria thus so dearly stated by the
Board, we can have no question that defendant has been giving service which is...
not authorized. ...
I& at 625.
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field of expertise of an administrative agency arise courts generally
defer to the agency. 8
For example, in United States v. Western Pacific R.R.,7 9 three
railroads sued the United States to recover the difference between
tariff rates actually paid and those allegedly owed on certain
shipments of Army steel bomb cases containing napalm. The
carriers claimed that they were entitled to payment at rates estab-
lished in a tariff filed with the ICC for "incendiary bombs." The
government claimed that since the bomb cases did not contain the
fuses required to ignite them, the applicable rate was for "gasoline
in steel drums."80 Although the case called only for a legal conclu-
sion as to which tariff applied, the Court invoked primary jurisdic-
tion because "a determination of the meaning of 'incendiary bomb'
... involves factors 'the adequate appreciation of which' presup-
poses an 'acquaintance with many intricate facts of trans-
portation.'"8 Such facts included "[c]omplex and technical cost-
allocation and accounting problems" involved in setting a tariff
rate to cover the "elaborate safety precautions necessary to carry
[bomb cases] in safety. '82
In contrast to Western Pacific is the approach taken by the First
Circuit in World Airways, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.83 The case
called for a legal conclusion whether World Airways was au-
thorized by its certificate of authority on file with the CAB to fly
certain charter flights.8 4 The court disagreed with the airline's
assertion that the legal questions involved technical problems which
should be considered by the CAB and held that none of the
problems involved required "administrative expertise" for their
solution.8 5
78 See, e.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922); United
States v. Great Northern Ry., 337 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1964). See generally, Lewers, Primary
Jurisdiction and the Royalty Owner: A Misapplied Doctrine, 23 Sw. L.J. 454, 472-77 (1969).
7 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
80 Id. at 60-61.
81 Id. at 66.
82 Id.
83 349 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 984 (1966).
84 Id. at 1008-09.
85 Id. at 1011. The court stated its position as follows:
The appellants say that the grants of ... authority for charter trips ... "[raise]
issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges . .. requiring the
exercise of administrative discretion." We see the case in a different light.... The
language of the certificate is dear . . . .The answer depends on whether the
contract violates this exclusion and requires an analysis of the contract. The
analysis, interpretation, construction, and application of contracts are within judicial
competence and, at least in the case before us, require no administrative expertise
for a solution.
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Thus, the rule for application of primary jurisdiction has come
to be stated in terms closely tied to its purposes. In contrast, the
unclear state law test for application of the abstention doctrine
offers no real guide on its face. Because of the influence of equity
and comity upon it, the test is of limited usefulness in predicting
whether a court will abstain in a given case.8 6 The primary jurisdic-
tion rule is easily followed; the unclear state law rule is not.
What is necessary in dealing with abstention, therefore, is a
recoguition similar to that which already seems to be present in
cases dealing with primary jurisdiction-i.e., that the rules guiding
application of the doctrine must be grounded in its purposes. The
presence of unclear state law should no longer be routinely cited as
a sufficient reason for invoking or rejecting abstention. Instead,
courts should acknowledge that the dearness of the law has been
balanced against other specific concerns of abstention.8 7
Explicit recognition and treatment of all principal factors
involved in abstention and not just unclear state law will result in at
least a minimum amount of guidance for future decisions. Differ-
ent weight given to these factors by different courts may lead to
divergent outcomes. But at least these differing outcomes can be
understood as resulting from the nature of the abstention doctrine
instead of flaws in its application.
B. Complex and Pervasive State Regulatory Schemes
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 88 the Supreme Court was asked to
enjoin an order of the Railroad Commission of Texas permitting
Id.; accord, Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Export Drum Co., 359 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1966); CAB v.
Aeromatic Travel Co., 341 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 560 (1970).
8 See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
87 The proposed codification of the abstention doctrine, ALl, STUDY OF THE DivisioN OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1371(c) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968), lists
both the requirement of an unclear state law question in § 1371(c)(1) and the reasons for
abstention in § 1371(c)(2), but does not admit to a balancing of the two.
The fact that some sort of balancing takes place is recognized and approved of in
Keilin, Abstention From Jurisdiction: Accommodation or Abdication? 23 ARK. L. REv. 412, 429
(1969). Keilin does not recognize that the failure to explicitly acknowledge the balancing,
especially in cases where the state law appears to be clear, beclouds the doctrine of
abstention. He does suggest, however, that an analysis similar to that used in primary
jurisdiction cases is appropriate for abstention.
Professor Wright, on the other hand, proposes that, within broad limits, the decision to
abstain should be left to the discretion of the district courts. Wright, supra note 18, at 825-26.
The boundaries which Wright would set include cases "where a federal constitutional
question is intermingled with unsettled questions of state law." Id. at 826. Here again, the
problem is that what is considered to be unsettled state law is in part determined by other
influences. A clearer conception of abstention would result if the presence of these factors
were acknowledged by decision makers.
88 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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the drilling and operation of certain oil wells in the East Texas Oil
Field. The Court observed that "[t]he order under consideration is
part of the general regulatory system devised for the conservation
of oil and gas in Texas, an aspect of 'as thorny a problem as has
challenged the ingenuity and wisdom of legislatures.' ",89
In deciding whether a federal court sitting in equity should
exercise its jurisdiction to hear the question,9" the Supreme Court
first took notice of the nonlegal complexities involved in analyzing
the rules of the Commission.91 The Court also observed the special
method by which Commission orders were reviewed in the Texas
courts. All review was concentrated in one court to avoid the
confusion of conflicting results by different state courts. Moreover,
the court responsible for all review had as much power as the
Commission itself since the court tested by trial de novo the
reasonableness of all Commission orders.92
Given these circumstances, and given that the questions at
issue so clearly involved "basic problems of Texas policy," 93 the
Court concluded that the Texas courts should be given the first
opportunity to consider the case:
The State provides a unified method for the formation of
policy and determination of cases by the Commission and by the
state courts. The judicial review of the Commission's decisions in
the state courts is expeditious and adequate. Conflicts in the
interpretation of state law, dangerous to the success of state
policies, are almost certain to result from the intervention of the
lower federal courts. . . Under such circumstances, a sound
respect for the independence of state action requires the federal
equity court to stay its hand.9 4
The Burford situation is highly analogous to that facing the
courts in primary jurisdiction cases. For all practical purposes, the
reviewing state court in the Texas regulatory scheme was a part of
the administrative agency. It had the same powers as the agency
and enjoyed special expertise in a complicated and complex area. 95
s9 Id. at 318.
o Id.
I ld. at 323.
92 Id. at 326-27.
93 Id. at 332.
94 Id. at 333-34; accord, Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
95 319 U.S. at 326.
[Tihe Texas courts are working partners with the Railroad Commission in the
business of creating a regulatory system for the oil industry.... [Tihe orders of the
Commission are tested for "reasonableness" by trial de novo before the court...
and the court may on occasion make a careful analysis of all the facts of the case in
reversing a Commission order. . . . The court has fully as much power as the
[Vol. 60:75
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Where a state court is viewed in this way, deferral to it is
similar to deferral to a federal agency under the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine. Both types of deferral turn on the technical expertise
of the "agency" and its familiarity with the problems involved.
Likewise, the same goal ot achieving uniform rulings is present in
both approaches. In fact, the Supreme Court regards the two as
being so similar that, in at least one decision, it has cited Burford as
general authority for primary jurisdiction. 96 Thus, if consistency is
valued, Burford stands on solid analytical ground.
Few of the cases following Burford have involved a state court
so closely related to a state agency that it could be considered a part
of it.97  Thus, the Burford rule has gradually become more
generalized. The rule retains the requirement that there be a
possibility of serious interference with a complex regulatory
scheme, but no longer requires the special relationship of the state
court to the agency. The federal courts have become concerned
only with whether the aggrieved party .has available adequate state
judicial review.98
This change weakens the analogy between Burford abstention
and primary jurisdiction because there is no longer any special
Commission to determine particular cases, since it can either restrain the
leaseholder from proceeding to drill, or, if the case is appropriate, can restrain the
Commission from interfering with the leaseholder. The court may even formulate
new standards for the Commission's administrative practice and suggest that the
Commission adopt them.
Id. 96 Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 567 (1946).
" See, e.g., Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); Hander v. San
Jadnto Junior College, 325 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Bonanza Airlines, Inc. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 186 F. Supp. 674 (D. Nev. 1960).
"I See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 319 F. Supp.
407 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). The
district court noted:
As [abstention] applies to disputes between private parties and state administrative
agencies, the primary thrust of the doctrine is that where an order of the state
agency predominantly affects local matters, if there is available to the aggrieved
party adequate state judicial review, the federal courts should [abstain] ....
319 F. Supp. at 413.
Compare Holmes v..New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 267 (2d Cir.
1968), where the lack of a specially designated court to review agency decisions was used to
distinguish the case from Burford. See generally Liebenthal, supra note 18, at 163-64.
The dropping of the requirement of a specialized state court was largely influenced by
the result in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951), discussed in
text accompanying notes 100-06 infra. The emphasis on whether there is adequate review in
state courts has developed as a result of the fact that Burford-type abstention requires
dismissal of the case by the federal court. Compare Pullman-type abstention where jurisdic-
tion is usually retained (e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213,
222-23 (1966)), and where a plaintiff's federal claims may be saved for a federal court (e.g.,
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964)).
1974]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
emphasis on the technical expertise of the reviewing court. Yet,
federal courts appear to retain the belief that state courts can deal
more knowledgeably than the federal bench with complex state
regulatory schemes. 99 To the extent this is true, the analogy be-
tween abstention and primary jurisdiction is still applicable and
the wisdom of deferring to the state court is supported by the
comparison.
C. Politically Important State Programs
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry.,100 established
a new rationale for abstention which led finally to Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux. 101 This rationale substantially alters
the analogy between Burford and primary jurisdiction.
In Alabama Public Service Commission, the plaintiff railroad
asked for an injunction to void an order by the Alabama Commis-
sion prohibiting the railroad from discontinuing certain intrastate
passenger routes.' 0 2 The Supreme Court reversed a district court
decision granting the injunction and held that the district court
should have abstained.
Although noting that "intrastate rail service is 'primarily the
concern of the state,'"103 the Court made no claim that it faced a
complicated situation like that in Burford involving a unified state
regulatory scheme for a technically complex industry.1 0 4 Neverthe-
less, citing Burford as authority, the Court concluded that since
"adequate state court review... [was] available ... intervention of
a federal court [was] not necessary for the protection of federal
rights," 10 5 and that therefore, "the usual rule of comity must
govern."'1
0 6
. See notes 97 & 98 supra; cf. Public Utility Comm'n v. United Airlines, Inc,, 346 U.S.
402 (1953).
100 341 U.S. 341 (1951). The result was largely foreshadowed by Stainback v. Mo Hock
Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
101 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
102 341 U.S. at 342.
103 Id. at 346.
104 The Court noted in Burord that because of the technical interrelationship between
various land owners in an oil field, where the amount of oil drawn by any one land owner
necessarily affects the amount available to anyone else, a unified regulatory scheme was
necessary and any decision affecting one owner necessarily affected all the others. 319 U.S.
at 318-30. Moreover, the determination of what oil could be drawn by an owner was fraught
with "non-legal complexities" and complicated by the "sheer quantity of exception cases."
319 U.S. at 323, 324. In contrast the Court in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n faced only the issue
"of balancing the loss ... from continued operations of [two] trains ... with the public need
for that service." 341 U.S. at 347-48.
105 341 U.S. at 349. This difference between Bu rford and Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n is
not always recognized. See, e.g., Press v. Pasadena Ind. School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550, 554-55
(S.D. Tex. 1971).
106 341 U.S. at 350.
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Thus, as long as a state forum for asserting federal rights
exists, Alabama Public Service Commission requires that orders of
state regulatory agencies be reviewed in that state forum. This is
not because of the technical or complex nature of the problems
involved, but because the purposes of federalism' 07 are better
served by local state review. Thus, the court moved beyond the
reasons behind Burford to adopt a rationale based on comity.' 0
This rationale was further developed in Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux.'0 9 The Power and Light Company, in
a case removed to federal court on diversity grounds, challenged
the authority of the city to expropriate its land through eminent
domain. A state statute on its. face appeared to allow such action;
however, it had been interpreted by the Louisiana Attorney Gen-
eral to forbid the taking." 0 The district court abstained and the
Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court was not bothered that prior abstention cases had
been in equity, because those cases "did not apply a technical rule
of equity procedure.""' Rather, the Court viewed the cases as
reflecting "a deeper policy derived from . .. federalism." ' 1 2 Given
this broader basis, abstention in this case was proper because
[t]he considerations that prevailed in conventional equity suits
for avoiding the hazards of serious disruption by federal courts
of state government or needless friction between state and fed-
eral authorities are similarly appropriate in a state eminent
domain proceeding brought in, or removed to, a federal
court.
1 13
Moreover, the Court indicated that abstention would avoid the
107 See note 112 and accompanying text infra. The term "federalism" is used to refer to
the influences of comity.
108 This is a distinction often missed by courts who cite these two cases together or
consider them as one. See, e.g., Press v. Pasadena Ind. School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550, 554-55
(S.D. Tex. 1971); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 319 F. Supp.
407, 413 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
109 360 U.S. 25 (1959); accord, American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959).
110 360 U.S. at 30.
I &L at 28. This was not always the view of the Court. Compare Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53 (1954), where the Court declined to abstain because,
unlike the situation in Burford, "traditional equitable authority" was not involved.
An interesting result of dropping the equity requirement has occurred in diversity cases
where the defendant has raised constitutional defenses. At least one court has abstained to
avoid deciding the validity of the constitutional defenses until the plaintiff's state law
allegations are clarified by a state court. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. North Kansas City, 276 F.2d
932 (8th Cir. 1960).
112 360 U.S. at 28.
113 Id.
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necessity of having the federal court make a "dubious and tentative
forecast" of state law.' 14
Federal-state friction was to be avoided because eminent do-
main was "intimately involved with [the] sovereign prerogative" of
a state. 5 The Court considered abstention appropriate in any case
involving state functions of similar stature:
The justification for [abstention] .. . lies in regard for the
respective competence of the state and federal court systems and
for the maintenance of harmonious federal-state relations in a
matter close to the political interests of a State.116
Thus, having articulated its concern for equitable interference
by a federal court with state regulatory agencies in Alabama Public
Service Commission, the Court completed the next logical step. It
became concerned in diversity cases with federal interference with
state interests. Moreover, the subject of such interference was no
longer limited to state regulatory agencies but was extended to any
important state program. But the reasons for this concern re-
mained grounded in comity.
Thibodaux, however, was immediately clouded by the decision
in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co. 1 7 The Mashuda Com-
pany, which invoked diversity jurisdiction, challenged a completed
eminent domain proceeding on the ground that such action was
not allowed by a Pennsylvania statute. Despite its decision in
Thibodaux, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four ruling, did not
allow abstention. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan bor-
rowed several of the same reasons he had used earlier in his
dissent in Thibodaux.
Justice Brennan first indicated that the case dearly did not fall
within the Pullman rationale for abstention." 8 Nor did the case fall
within Burford or Alabama Public Service Commission categories, be-
cause adjudication by a federal court would not involve the poten-
tial hazard of disrupting federal-state relations. The Court would
114 Id. at 29. For a critical examination of the difficulty of predicting state law see Note,
Federal Interpretation of State Law-An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 MiNN. L. REv.
806 (1969).
115 360 U.S. at 28.
116 Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Among the other areas which have been considered
"close to the political interests of a state" are water rights in Arizona (Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968)), oil and gas leases in Texas (Barrett v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 444 F.2d 38, 43-44 (5th Cir. 1971)), and a state prison system (Urbano v.
Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 415 F.2d 247, 256-57 (3d Cir. 1969)).
117 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
118 Id. at 189.
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not be applying paramount federal law to prevent state officials
from carrying out state domestic policies, nor would it be enjoining
the state action.'19 Instead, "[tihe District Court would simply be
acting as would a court of the State in applying to the facts of this
case . ..settled state policy.' l20
This last argument was bolstered by the clear issue of state law
involved in Mashuda. The clearness of the question decreased the
chances of a "wrong" federal court decision and thus of the
possibility that a state program would suffer under a federal
court's incorrect interpretation of state law. In contrast, the
Thibodaux majority had emphasized that the district court was
"[c]aught between the language of an old but uninterpreted statute
and [a recent] pronouncement of the [state's] Attorney General"'21
and therefore was faced with a difficult state law question. 22
These two cases suggest the present status of Thibodaux absten-
tion. Given the different results in Thibodaux and Mashuda, it is
evident that an unclear question of state law must be present in
order to permit abstention. 2 3 Nevertheless, the cases are similar in
that the basis for abstention in both equity and diversity jurisdic-
tion is comity.
No such similar use of comity exists under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. Instead, the appropriateness of primary
jurisdiction turns on whether "the reasons for the existence of the
doctrine are present."'1 24 And those reasons deal only with the
119 Id. at 189-90.
120 Id. at 190.
121 360 U.S. at 30.
122 To use this unclearness of state law as a reason for abstention, the majority in
Thibodaux had to distinguish Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), which held
that in diversity suits the difficulty of a state law question was not a sufficient ground for
abstention. Unfortunately, the Thibodaux Court chose a "distinguishing feature" which had
nothing to do with the rationale for the Meredith decision. The Court indicated that Meredith
was different since the jurisdiction of the federal court was being challenged and dismissal of
the case was at issue. 360 U.S. at 27 n.2. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, seems
correct in noting that Meredith "did not turn on any difference between an abstention and a
dismissal." 360 U.S. at 38 n.4. See Comment, Abstention Under Delaney: A Current Appraisal, 49
TEXAS L. REv. 247, 251 (1971).
Thus, the abstention doctrine which has been distilled from these cases leaves unclear
the validity of Meredith. This fact has left the Fifth Circuit free to create a rationale for
abstention which is different from any of the rationales used for abstention thus far by the
Supreme Court. See notes 143-46 and accompanying text infra.
123 A recent court of appeals decision cites the unclear law question in Thibodaux as the
feature distinguishing it from Mashuda. Hill v. Victoria County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 441
F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1971).
124 United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); see cases cited in notes
68-74 and accompanying text supra.
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actual advantages gained by referring a problem to an agency.125
Although an agency might have a strong interest in a particular
program, the court does not defer to tle agency solely on that
basis.
In light of this primary jurisdiction test, which stresses whether
the advantages of the doctrine will result, the soundness of Alabama
Public Service Commission can be assessed. Based on a comparison
with primary jurisdiction cases, or even with Burford itself, the
"comity reasons" appear weak. If the state program is not complex
or pervasive, there is probably only a small chance that a federal
court will seriously interfere with the program by making an
"incorrect" decision. Although it is quite possible that the local
court is more familiar with the issues involved, that advantage
would seem small in nontechnical, noncomplex fields where the
state law question need not be unclear.1 26
Primary jurisdiction cases which have recognized that the
complexity and pervasiveness of a program are important elements
in deciding whether it is necessary to defer to an administrative
agency support this analysis. In United States v. Radio Corporation of
America,' 27 an antitrust suit, the key issue was whether primary
jurisdiction applied, requiring certain questions to be decided by
the Federal Communications Commission. The Supreme Court
noted that in general, when certain issues. fall within a particular
agency's field of expertise, federal courts should refer such issues
to the agency in order not to adversely affect its ability to
regulate. 28 But this rationale, said the Court, did not apply when
there was no delicate or complex scheme of regulation involved.' 29
125 See cases cited in notes 68-74 and accompanying text supra.
126 Some courts have recognized that in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n-type cases the
probability of federal court interference with the state program may be small. See, e.g.,
Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Compare the criticism of Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n in IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.203[1], at 2114 n.40 (2d ed. 1974).
127 358 U.S. 334 (1959). For a criticism that the Court should never have reached the
issue of the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme, see 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, § 19.06, at
636-37 (Supp. 1970). See generally 33 OHio ST. L.J. 209, 215-16 (1972).
128 358 U.S. at 348. With respect to antitrust regulation the Court observed:
[T]his Court consistently [has] held that when rates and practices relating [to a
regulatory scheme involving fixed rates] were challenged under the antitrust laws,
the agencies had primary jurisdiction to consider the reasonableness of such rates
and practices in the light of the many relevant factors including alleged antitrust
violations, for otherwise sporadic action by federal courts would disrupt an agency's
delicate regulatory scheme, and would throw existing rate structures out of balance.
Id.
129 "[T]here being no pervasive regulatory scheme, and no rate structures to throw out
of balance, sporadic action by federal courts can work no mischief. The justification for
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At one point in an abstention case, °30 the Court seemed to
recognize that the complexity and pervasiveness of regulation
should have a bearing on the need for abstention as well as the
need for respecting primary jurisdiction. In deciding whether
certain liquor sales to airline passengers leaving the United States
could be taxed by the state of New York, the Court rejected
abstention. One of the reasons it gave was that "[u]nlike many cases
in which abstention has been held appropriate, there was here no
danger that a federal decision would work a disruption of an entire
legislative scheme of regulation."' 3 '
The soundness of Thibodaux, like that of Alabama Public Service
Commission, can be assessed in light of the primary jurisdiction test
which insists that the doctrine be invoked only when the advan-
tages of the doctrine will result. Based on this comparison, the
reasons behind Thibodaux are comparatively stronger than those
behind Alabama Public Service Commission; yet they are still weak.
In Thibodaux, unlike in primary jurisdiction cases, there was no
attempt to inquire into the actual effect of a federal court decision
on the ability of the state to successfully run its program. 132
Whether a question is important to the state-even politically
important-does not necessarily mean the state will be adversely
affected by a federal court decision. In this respect, Thibodaux, like
Alabama Public Service Commission, is based purely on reasons of
deference to state courts growing out of theoretical values of
federalism.
However, Thibodaux at least requires that the issue of state law
be unclear' 33 Thus, deference to the state court could have some
of the same advantages that are gained in primary jurisdiction, in
that deferral is to a decision-maker more closely acquainted with
the issues involved. This could be especially significant since the
state law questions at issue are matters of political interest to the
state, and thus a "wrong" federal court decision could have del-
eterious consequences.
primary jurisdiction accordingly disappears." Id. at 350; see Denver Union Stockyard Co. v.
Denver Live Stock Comm'n Co., 404 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1968); cf. California v. FPC, 369
U.S. 482 (1962).
130 Hobsetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
131 Id. at 329.
132 See notes 68-76 and accompanying text supra. Some courts bave made this inquiry.
Another court has recognized the implications of failing to make this inquiry: "[I]f the
'avoidance of needless friction' standard were applied without due consideration, very few
federal question cases challenging any aspect of state law or state authority would be
appropriate for the federal courts." Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1972).
133 See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
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The Supreme Court did not explicitly rely upon this rationale,
but it did remark that a decision by the district court would only be
a "dubious and tentative forecast."'134 this invocation of language
from Pullman seems to indicate that the decision turns, at least to
some extent, on the superior ability of the state court to decide the
state law question at issue.' 35
The decision in another case tends to support this conclusion.
In Martin v. Creasy,136 the Supreme Court specifically discussed an
actual advantage the state court would have over the federal court
in deciding the case: "In the state court proceedings the case of
each landowner will be considered separately, with whatever par-
ticular problems each case may present."' 37
In response to the ultimate question of whether there are any
advantages to abstention sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff's
congressionally-given right to be in federal court, Thibodaux offers
the assertion that the state court is in a better position to make the
decision. Alabama Public Service Commission, which does not depend
on an unclear state law question, offers no such advantage. But
beyond this, neither case inquires into any particular advantage a
state court decision might have over a federal court decision.
Respect for state courts seems to be considered sufficient to deny a
plaintiff access to federal court.
Primary jurisdiction tilts its balance the other way. The doc-
trine requires something in addition to comity in order to deny a
plaintiff access to federal court. The question becomes, therefore,
whether greater respect, for respect's sake, needs to be paid to state
courts, than to federal agencies. The answer should be no. When
Congress mandated concurrent jurisdiction, it decided the policy
of division between jurisdictions. This is just as true between state
and federal courts as between federal agencies and federal courts.
For this reason, primary jurisdiction requires that there should
be an actual and substantial advantage to ignoring one's own
jurisdiction in favor of another.1 38 If there is no such advantage, it
appears to be an abdication of the congressional edict for a court to
refuse to hear a plaintiff's case because of the court's personal
134 360 U.S. at 29. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
135 In Pullman the Court expressed the state court's special competence in these terms:
"Reading the Texas statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders without special competence
in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our independent judgment regarding the
application of that law to the present situation." 312 U.S. at 499.
136 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
137 Id. at 224-25.
138 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
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predilections concerning the theoretical advantages of comity.
Since Alabama Public Service Commission, and, to a large extent,
Thibodaux, are based on the theoretical advantages of comity, they
differ from the sounder policy of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
D. Abstention in the Fifth Circuit
There is another rationale for abstention which has not been
developed by the Supreme Court. In Green v. American Tobacco
Co., 1'3 9 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard a diversity
of citizenship case involving the potential liability of a cigarette
manufacturer to the widow and estate of a smoker who died from
lung cancer. The court decided an issue of Florida law which was
unclear under existing Florida precedent; but upon rehearing it
revoked its original decision and held instead that the Florida
courts should decide the question. 140 This was easily accomplished
because Florida had a certification procedure whereby issues of
Florida law could be sent directly to the Florida Supreme Court
from a federal court.' 4 '
In Green no authority was cited for abstaining. Instead, the
court justified its decision by pointing to two factors: the impor-
tance of the question involved and the split among members of the
circuit on what was the correct decision.' 42
More formal authorization for the type of abstention invoked
in Green had to await the court's decision in United Services Life
Insurance Co. v. Delaney,143 a case involving the question whether
under Texas law life insurance policies which covered "passengers"
of certain aircraft should be held to cover pilots. Analyzing rele-
vant Texas law, five members of the circuit noted that "[t]he
139 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on rehearing, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
140 304 F.2d at 85-86. The court originally decided that under Florida law a cigarette
manufacturer was not an absolute insurer of its product on a theory of implied warranty
because it had no superior knowledge of the product's effects. This holding resulted from a
jury finding that no human skill or foresight could lead to the manufacturer's knowledge
that lung cancer could result from cigarette smoking. On rehearing the court reversed itself
and abstained in order to certify the question to the Florida Supreme Court.
141 The Supreme Court recognized the Florida certification procedure in Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960). Certification has been alternately praised (Kaplan,
Certification of Questions From Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact
on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413 (1962)), offered as a solution to some of
the problems of abstention (ALI STUDY, supra note 16, § 1371(3), at 213; Lillich & Mundy,
Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 888 (1971)), and
criticized (Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of
Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMi L. REV. 717 (1969)).
142 304 F.2d at 86.
143 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964). See generally Comment,
supra note 122.
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guidance of the dim light of the Texas decisions [left] the meaning
of the questioned clauses obscure.' 44 Citing Thibodaux, the five
thought referral to the Texas courts was the best course of
action. 14
5
Four members of the circuit dissented. They believed that a
case involving only an unclear question of state law must be
decided by a federal court because of the congressional mandate
inherent in diversity jurisdiction and because of the Supreme
Court's holding in Meredith v. Winter Haven146 that the difficulty of
a state law question is not a sufficient ground for abstention in a
diversity suit. Moreover, the dissenters felt this was not the type of
exceptional case which came under the Thibodaux rule. 47
Judge Brown, in concurring, was prompted by the strong
dissent to rationalize the holding on a basis other than Thibodaux.
He emphasized that abstention was demanded by unclear questions
of state law.' 48
Indeed, it is hard to put the question involved in Delaney in the
144 328 F.2d at 484.
145 Id. Ironically, the Texas Supreme Court refused to decide the case upon referral.
Since the federal court retained jurisdiction, the Texas court felt this rendered their decision
an impermissible advisory opinion. United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855
(Tex. 1965). Compare the Florida procedure of certification discussed at note 141 and
accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of the merits of the Delaney decision see note 157 and accompanying
text infra.
146 360 U.S. 228 (1943). The Supreme Court in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 260 U.S. 25 (1959), left unclear the status of Meredith. See note 122 supra. Some
circuits still recognize Meredith as controlling. See note 151 and accompanying text infra.
147 328 F.2d at 485.
The mandate from Congress that we decide diversity cases, Title 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332; Meredith v. City of Winter Haven .... makes plain our duty to decide
these matters.
They are not the exceptional cases referred to in Meredith v. City of Winter
Haven ... where a federal court may d6cline to act, nor do they fall in one of the
classes of cases where the doctrine of abstention bas been given application.
Id.
148 Id. at 485-89. Judge Brown saw abstention in the circumstances of an unclear state
law question as an opportunity to effectuate the purposes of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). If, in Erie-type cases, it was unfair for a result to turn on irrelevant accidents
such as citizenship, Judge Brown thought it was likewise unfair for a result to turn on
diverse holdings between federal and state courts on what was the substantive law of a state.
328 F.2d at 485. For an extension of Judge Brown's views see W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel
Corp:, 388 F.2d 257, 262-67 (10th Cir. 1967) (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
For criticism of Judge Brown's analysis see Agata, Delaney, Diversity, and Delay: Abstention
or Abdication?, 4 HOUSTON L. REv. 422, 431-39 (1966); Gowen & Izlar, Federal Court Abstention
in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 194, 211-13 (1964); Comment, supra
note 122, at 256. For mild support of Judge Brown's analysis see Note, FederalAbstention and
Its Relation to the Erie Doctrine, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 72, 83-84 (1964). For an appreciation of Judge
Brown's position, but ultimate rejection of it, see Liebenthal, supra note 18, at 183-201.
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Thibodaux category of a question politically important to the
state. 149 Later Fifth Circuit cases have made it clear that the basis of
their abstention doctrine is solely the unclear nature of the state
law.150
Other circuits disagree with abstention in such cases because
they consider Meredith still determinative of the issue.1 51 Regardless
of whether or not Meredith controls, a comparison with primary
jurisdiction can offer some insights into the quality of the Fifth
Circuit doctrine.
As stated previously, the fundamental test for primary juris-
diction has been whether the purposes of the doctrine would be
served by its use in a given situation.1 52 Those purposes relate to
the superior ability of the agency to handle the particular issues
before the court. 153 In this sense, both primary jurisdiction and
Fifth Circuit abstention recognize the advantages of referring cases
to a decision-maker who is more acquainted with the issues in-
volved in the problem.
Primary jurisdiction, however, unlike Fifth Circuit abstention,
has a justifiable basis for denying the plaintiff his right to be in a
federal court. The court defers to the superior ability of the agency
because a "wrong" decision by the court can affect the agency's
ability to accomplish its statutory purposes. 154 The court therefore
overrules the congressionally-given right to be in federal court in
favor of effectuating the congressional purposes behind setting up
the regulatory agency. Such considerations are legitimate because
they are the result of problems which directly result from the
nature of concurrent jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the judges of the Fifth Circuit, except for
Judge Brown, offer no reason for denying the plaintiff his
congressionally-given right to be in federal court, other than the
rather weak justification that the court is faced with a difficult
1 9 For a discussion of politically important questions see notes 100-38 and accompany-
ing text supra.
150 See, e.g., Boyd v. Bowman, 455 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1972); Martinez v. Rodriquez, 394
F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1968); Life Ins. Co. v. Shifflet, 370 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1967); Hopkins v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 358 F.2d 34T (5th Cir. 1966).
151 See, e.g., King-Smith v. Aaron, 455 F.2d 378, 380 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972); Garvin v.
Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972); Martin v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720
(4th Cir. 1967); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
152 See notes 124-29 and accompanying text supra.
15I See notes 68-74 and accompanying text supra.
154 See notes 23-31 and accompanying text supra.
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question of state law. 155 There are no claims of comity as in
Thibodaux and Alabama Public Service Commission.' 56
Thus, the reasons for abstention by the Fifth Circuit do not
flow from the concurrent nature of diversity jurisdiction or the
problems associated with that concurrent jurisdiction. For this
reason, the Fifth Circuit doctrine is an -unsupportable extension of
the abstention doctrine.' 57
III
CONCLUSIONS FROM A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has, in a number of cases spanning many
years, established wide and somewhat uncertain criteria for the
doctrine of abstention. Because abstention almost always inflicts a
longer and more costly law suit on a plaintiff, fundamental fairness
requires that the doctrine be invoked only where valid reasons
support its use. The purpose of this Article has been to analyze the
validity of the present criteria for abstention by comparing them to
those which support the more lucid doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion.
A number of important considerations have emerged from
1'5 Judge Brown's reasons for abstention focus upon the problems posed by concurrent
diversity jurisdiction, but his analysis has been the subject of substantial criticism. See note
148 supra.
1'6 See text accompanying notes 102-06 & 132-33 supra. In one primary jurisdiction case
another circuit has made the same mistake that was made in Delaney. In Wheelabrator Corp.
v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court sent a case to the General Accounting
Office (GAO) because of the GAO's greater expertise. However, there was not concurrent
jurisdiction between the GAO and the court over the issue. Thus, the court sacrificed the
plaintiffs congressional right to be in federal court for no other reason than that the court
faced a difficult question. The court, if it wanted the help of the agency, should have instead
had the agency become a party to the proceedings before it. This was done, for example, in
Catholic Medical Center, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
1,7 Professor Agata, using a different method of analysis, reaches a similar conclusion:
"Problems of federalism, which justify abstention in federal question cases, deny the general
application of abstention in diversity cases." Agata, supra note 148, at 430.
Support for Delaney in Note, Fifth Circuit Abstention Procedure-A Proposed Solution, 52
IowA L. REv. 686 (1967), is based on erroneous conclusions. The Fifth Circuit does not, as
the author contends, depend on an Erie rationale. Id. at 695. Only Judge Brown uses that
basis and it has heen the subject of substantial attack. See note 148 supra. Nor can the
decision be based on Thibodaux as the author suggests. See text accompanying notes 147-50
supra.
Most commentary on Delaney, however, has been extremely critical. See, e.g., Gowen &
Izlar, supra note 148, at 211-14; Comment, Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Abstention,
1965 DUKE L.J. 102, 107-12; Comment, Abstention under Delaney: A Current Appraisal, 49
TEXAs L. REv. 247 (1971); Comment, supra note 148; Note, Abstention and Certification in
Diversity Suits: "Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YAI L.J. 850 (1964).
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this analysis. They merit at least a brief summary. Abstention
under Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.158 professed to use a
simple boundary-type test of whether an unclear question of state
law could be resolved by the state court to avoid the unnecessary
decision by the federal court of a constitutional law question. But
in fact, no consistent criteria for determining an unclear state law
question can be observed in the opinion. Instead, the degree of
clarity of the state law question, along with other factors such as
comity and the nature of the rights involved, appear to have been
the principal factors in determining whether abstention would
occur.
In contrast, primary jurisdiction uses as a test a determination
of whether the reasons for the doctrine are present and whether
the purposes of the doctrine would be served by invoking it.
Because it focuses on the factors which influence courts to use the
doctrine, the results of primary jurisdiction cases are more under-
standable than the results in many abstention cases, especially those
cases in which abstention is ordered in the face of what appears to
be a clear question of state law.
This comparison suggests that Pullman abstention should
utilize a balancing-of-factors test rather than trying to fashion a test
based on the presence or absence of an unclear state law question.
Although the balancing test would not have the consistency found
in primary jurisdiction, since various factors are to be weighed
against each other, it could lead to a clearer understanding of the
factors that courts should consider in deciding whether to abstain.
Abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 159 has been shown to
be an almost identical counterpart to primary jurisdiction. But
even in cases where Burford's characteristic feature, i.e., a state
court of special expertise, is not present and the strict analogy fails,
abstention is still similar to primary jurisdiction since referral to a
state court, like referral to an agency, can be justified on the basis
of its greater familiarity with the complex and pervasive system of
regulation.
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry. 160 and
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux161 have replaced the
Burford criteria for abstention with the requirement that a state
program must be politically important rather than complex and
158 312 U.S. 496 (1941); see notes 38-87 and accompanying text supra.
159 319 U.S. 315 (1943); see notes 88-99 and accompanying text supra.
180 341 U.S. 341 (1951); see notes 100-08 and accompanying text supra.
161 360 U.S. 25 (1959); see notes 109-16 and accompanying text supra.
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pervasive. With this change, the rationale of abstention has shifted
from that of using the greater expertise or experience of the state
court to that of respecting federal-state' comity in both diversity
cases and equitable suits.
Unlike the test in primary jurisdiction, however, no attention is
paid to whether the federal court decision would cause any real
interference with the state programs. In fact, by dropping the
requirement that the state program be complex and pervasive, the
likelihood of a "wrong" decision by the federal court is less and the
chances of interference are decreased. Thus, deference to the state
courts without such an inquiry has to be viewed as being based on
theoretical values of federalism.
However, the approach in Thibodaux does differ from that of
Alabama Public Service Commission in one important respect since it
requires that the state law question involved be unclear. Thus the
rationale behind primary jurisdiction that the decision-maker to
whom the problem is referred is likely to be more familiar with it
could also be cited in favor of abstention in a Thibodaux situation.
But the analogy to primary jurisdiction also suggests that
abstention for the purpose of respecting theoretical values of
comity is improper. In primary jurisdiction, a plaintiff's
congressionally-given right to be in federal court is denied in order
to enhance the ability of an agency to regulate. One congressional
policy is balanced against another. In alstention cases, however,
the congressional edict that a plaintiff can sue in federal court is
balanced only against the court's own views of the policy advan-
tages of comity.
Finally, the furthest extension of the abstention doctrine ap-
pears in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United Services Life Insurance
Co. -D. Delaney.' 62 Unlike the balancing in primary jurisdiction, the
Fifth. Circuit approach is not tied to the concurrent nature of
jurisdiction between federal and state courts. And unlike any of the
previous abstention cases, the Delaney rationale is not shaped by
problems supposedly resulting from this concurrent jurisdiction. It
arises only from the desire of the court to avoid deciding difficult
questions. As such, the Fifth Circuit doctrine is an unsound and
impermissible extension of the abstention doctrine.
In sum, since abstention and primary jurisdiction rest upon
substantially similar theoretical grounds, it follows that, ideally, the
two doctrines should also be similar in their application. As the
162 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964); see notes 143-57 and
accompanying text supra.
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preceding analysis has shown, however, this is not the case. While
primary jurisdiction focuses upon the actual benefits to be achieved
by referring the litigation to another decision-maker, abstention
involves no such concrete test. As a result, the primary jurisdiction
doctrine places well-defined limits on the discretion of the federal
court while abstention permits a court to deny access to a federal
forum based upon the court's own views of the policy advantages
of such a denial. Thus, the primary jurisdiction test pays greater
heed to the congressional grant of jurisdiction and only denies it
when there is a significant advantage in so doing. It would seem,
therefore, that the abstention doctrine could be made more palat-
able to litigants and courts by the incorporation of the primary
jurisdiction "actual benefits" test.
